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Abstract. Distinguishing between the old atheism, the new atheism, and modest 
atheism, and also between belief and acceptance, and belief and acceptance 
tokens and types, I  defend the disjunctive view that either modest atheistic 
belief or modest atheistic acceptance, construed as type, is today epistemically 
justified in the context of philosophical inquiry. Central to my defence is 
a deductive version of the hiddenness argument and an emphasis on the early 
stage of philosophical inquiry that we presently occupy.
I begin with distinctions between what I shall call the old atheism, the 
new atheism, and modest atheism. The old atheism, exemplified by J. L. 
Mackie in his book The Miracle of Theism (1982) and by hundreds of others, 
especially from the Enlightenment on, has the following three features. 
It is narrowly personalist (that is, concerned only with a conception of 
God as person, or something like a person); it is commonly supported 
by philosophical arguments; and it is purely negative (that is to say, 
restricted to denying the existence of a personal God).
The new atheism, exemplified by Richard Dawkins in his book The 
God Delusion (2006) and by at least three others (though many more are 
cheering the ‘four horsemen’ on), lacks each of these features. For it is quite 
generally opposed to the idea of transcendent or supernatural realities 
and thus has a  broader than personalist focus; it tends, moreover, to 
depend on appeals, implicit or explicit, to a certain positive metaphysics, 
namely, scientific naturalism (hereafter: naturalism); and because of the 
previous point, it cannot be said to restrict itself to a  purely negative 
claim.
In my view, there are a number of things wrong with the new atheism, 
and its epistemological approach – to the extent that it has one – is flawed. 
Ideology-infused bellicosity too often takes the place of careful reasoning 
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here. If atheism depends on such a flawed epistemology, then atheism 
should be rejected by philosophers. Happily (or unhappily, depending 
on your view), atheism does not depend on it, and so we cannot turn 
that conditional into a sound instance of modus ponens. Most obviously, 
there is also the less flamboyant but more formidable old atheism, whose 
arguments against theism and in support of its own negative claim have, 
over the past few centuries, been something of a  thorn in the side for 
theistic philosophers.
When I was young, I identified with the old atheism, and sought to 
enlarge its store of arguments with new philosophical arguments from 
hiddenness, horrors, and free will (yes, there is a free will offence as well 
as a free will defence). But in the last decade or so I have moved to a more 
nuanced position which I shall here call modest atheism.
At first glance modest atheism may seem somewhat less than modest, 
for it does not reject any of the three features distinguishing old atheism, 
instead adding to them. (It might therefore also be called old atheism 
plus.) But what it adds makes for an overall stance that includes a modest, 
even sceptical strain. Modest atheism supposes to be false a  certain 
precise affirmative proposition about the existence of an ultimate divine 
reality influential in both western philosophy and western religion – that 
the divine exists as person and actor – while regarding it as epistemically 
possible (by which I  mean ‘not justifiedly deniable’) that some other 
affirmative proposition about the existence of a  religious ultimate, 
perhaps one unknown or even unknowable to us today, should one 
day prove to be true. While it closes the book on personal theism, it is 
open – and explicitly open – to the discovery of other forms of divine 
reality. And it is so (quite ironically given the preoccupations of the new 
atheism, whose opposition in the name of science to all things religious 
we have already noted) at least partly in light of what science teaches us 
about our place in evolutionary time, a place which, when we make the 
appropriate transition from human to scientific timescales, we will see 
to be at the very beginning of intelligent inquiry on our planet, which 
our self-important species has grown accustomed to treating as though 
it were the end.
I  take it that the old atheism is not thus open. Indeed, here we hit 
on an  assumption apparently shared by the old and the new atheists. 
This assumption is that there is truth in religion only if something like 
personal theism is true. If this assumption is not being made by the old 
atheists, then how shall we explain the fact that, after reaching atheism, 
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they venture no further in religious investigation? Most old atheists, 
just like new atheists, are naturalists, even if they don’t crudely conflate 
atheism with naturalism at the conceptual level. And if this assumption 
is not being made by the new atheists, then how shall we explain the fact 
that they do tend to conflate atheism with naturalism?
Modest atheism, therefore, is unlike each of the other atheisms in 
its openness to nontheistic religious discoveries, perhaps ones occurring 
only in the far future. It does not rule them out. That is to say, it is more 
modest.
In this essay I  want to defend the claim that modest atheism is in 
good shape, epistemologically. But to prepare the way for this defence 
some more distinctions are needed. We need to distinguish between 
atheism (of any kind) as proposition, as belief, and as acceptance, and 
then also between belief and acceptance tokens and types.
Much of what I have said so far could be understood on the assumption 
that atheism is a proposition or claim of some kind – in the case of modest 
atheism, the proposition that no personal God exists but some other 
depiction of the divine may someday prove correct. In philosophical 
discussions of whether atheism is true this propositional interpretation is 
clearly being applied. For only propositions are literally true or false. But 
we might also – and sometimes do – ask whether so-and-so’s atheism is 
well grounded or justified, or speak (as I did earlier) of a person’s state of 
mind as exemplifying atheism. And here we are usually instead thinking 
about a certain individual’s belief that an atheistic proposition is true. But 
there is yet a third possibility, which tends to be overlooked in philosophy 
today but will become more salient as the distinction in epistemology 
between belief and acceptance is further clarified and utilized – a process 
which, perhaps optimistically, I think is well underway. This is that the 
atheism of a philosopher such as myself, or of any person, may amount 
to an acceptance of the relevant proposition rather than belief of it. In 
close but not quite complete conformity with what L. Jonathan Cohen 
says about that distinction in his excellent book on the subject (1992), 
I suggest that the term ‘acceptance’ is most helpfully used to name what 
is described when we speak of in a  fully voluntary manner forming 
and maintaining a  policy of treating a  proposition as true, using it as 
a  basis for inference. A  corollary is that the term ‘acceptance’ ought 
to be distinguished from ‘belief,’ which rather names a  less than fully 
voluntary disposition (or set of dispositions) such as the involuntary 
disposition Cohen himself identifies with belief: namely, the disposition 
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to feel a proposition true in relevant circumstances. It seems clear that 
sometimes the ‘position’ of a  philosopher on this issue or that should 
be understood in terms of that philosopher’s accepting a  certain 
proposition rather than in terms of belief. And perhaps at an early stage 
of investigation, of the sort I  have said we will see ourselves to be in 
when we fully absorb scientific timescales, there will often be occasion 
for acceptance even if not for belief.
Suppose, then, that we have seen the differences between atheism 
as proposition, as belief, and as acceptance. Suppose also that we have 
noticed that the conditions of belief ’s justification might be different 
from those attaching to the justification of acceptance (more on this 
later), and accordingly that the epistemology of atheism as belief might 
be different from the epistemology of atheism as acceptance. There is 
still – and finally – the distinction between belief and acceptance tokens 
and types to take note of.
This is really a distinction between different senses of the expressions 
‘belief that p’ and ‘acceptance that p’. Sometimes it is a  certain way of 
believing or accepting, the belief or acceptance that p, that we have in 
mind when we use such an expression, and to use it correctly we need 
not presuppose that this belief or acceptance is realized in anyone 
(even if its appropriateness to this or that mental or social context is 
discussed); but in another sense what we may have in mind is his or her 
belief or acceptance that p, and in evaluating the belief or acceptance 
thus understood we evaluate the person who exemplifies it by way of 
assessing their relevant dispositions (the dispositions involved in their 
coming to, or not ceasing to, include in their mental repertoire the belief 
or acceptance in question). In the former abstract case what we have 
is a belief or acceptance type; in the latter concrete case it is a belief or 
acceptance token.
In considering the justification of a  belief or acceptance type in 
connection with the existence of God what we are looking for is 
a  worthiness of instantiation that abstract discussion of whether belief 
or acceptance is best among available responses (either the best or 
a best, and either way such as cannot be exceeded) will help us discern; 
such discussion, in my view, is the task of philosophers, and I shall be 
engaging in it here. Whereas in evaluating belief or acceptance tokens 
the relevant desideratum is what we may call responsibility, which 
amounts to something like the proper fulfilment of all relevant duties 
and the exercise of intellectual virtue in the formation and maintenance 
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of belief or acceptance by the relevant believer or accepter. There is this 
connection between the two levels of evaluation that may be noted: if 
one declares a certain response type to be unjustified within a certain 
context and so unworthy of being instantiated, then one will also think 
that, other things being equal, investigation of the most responsible 
and virtuous sort will in that context lead to such a response type not 
being instantiated by the investigator, and so the investigator will, in the 
token sense, not be justified in exhibiting that response. But there are 
obviously many variables that can prevent facts about type and token 
justifications from matching up here, such as persistent controversy over 
type justification, the amounts of information particular investigators 
have about the results of formal inquiry, and so on.
So when I say that I mean to defend the thesis that modest atheism is 
in good shape, epistemologically, do I have in mind atheism as belief or 
acceptance, and will it be belief or acceptance as token or type? What I’ve 
just said about the task of philosophers leads me to a focus on response 
types. And the distinction between belief and acceptance affords the 
defence of modest atheism some flexibility here, which I intend to make 
use of. The view I  shall defend is accordingly the following: that either 
modest atheistic belief or modest atheistic acceptance, construed as type, 
is today justified (i.e., worthy of being instantiated) within the context of 
philosophical inquiry about things religious. Since this is the view I mean 
to defend, it may from here on be assumed that when I speak of atheistic 
belief or acceptance I am speaking of a certain type of stance. I myself think 
modest atheistic belief is justified, but I shall argue only for the weaker 
disjunctive claim. And the final result I’m aiming at is indeed a successful 
defence – in a short paper I cannot hope to establish my conclusion but 
I do intend to advance its cause, to put it in a more favourable light.
Even so, I have my work cut out for me. How will the defence proceed? 
I want now to suggest that here too modest atheism can do something 
to earn its name, for it is also in a way modest in the sort of reasoning 
it uses to support itself. At first, you will want to say, once again, that 
what I  count as modesty here is really immodesty! For the reasoning 
I have in mind is deductive reasoning – and haven’t we long since come 
to appreciate that deductive arguments for the nonexistence of God are 
hopelessly over-optimistic? Hasn’t atheistic philosophy of religion in the 
past few decades come to focus, much more modestly and appropriately, 
on inductive reasoning, such as the probabilistic reasoning of William 
Rowe or Paul Draper (Howard-Snyder, ed. 1996)?
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My reason for focusing on deductive arguments, and daring to call 
what I am doing modest, is in part bound up with what is required to justify 
belief on big issues such as those of philosophy at an evolutionarily early 
stage of inquiry such as our own. I would not say that no philosophical 
beliefs at all can presently be justified; that way an  inquiry-stultifying 
scepticism looms. But I  do say that a  justification for philosophical 
belief is, at an  early stage of inquiry, much easier to provide where 
compelling grounds, such as those embodied by an  apparently sound 
deductive argument, are available. In the absence of compelling grounds, 
in particular where probabilistic arguments alone are given, I  think 
inquirers should be much more reluctant to claim justification for 
philosophical belief as opposed to, say, an increase in the probability that 
a certain philosophical claim is true. My modesty consists, in part, in this 
reluctance.
But my immodesty, you may now say, consists in my suggestion that 
the high bar I have set up can be reached in the case of atheism! Well, is 
it any more modest to assume that no other good deductive arguments 
against the existence of God will be discovered than have already been 
discovered at a relatively early point in the evolution of intelligence, say, 
1982? This, it appears, is what any pre-emptive argument of the sort 
suggested by the critic must assume. In any case, here it is important 
to recall my disjunctive approach, which will be satisfied even if only 
acceptance of the proposition put forward by the modest atheist can in 
some way be justified. Deductive arguments, as we will see, may have 
a role to play in relation to acceptance too.
So which deductive argument(s) for the nonexistence of God will 
I advance? Well, when I saw the line-up of topics and speakers gracing 
the conference on the epistemology of atheism for which this paper 
was written, I  noticed that the hiddenness argument was to receive 
considerable discussion. Since – as I note perhaps without modesty but 
I think truthfully – I was responsible for getting that way of reasoning 
into discussion a couple of decades ago (Schellenberg 1993), I decided 
that I might as well jump on the bandwagon and convey how I view the 
hiddenness argument at present, using this to develop my case. But there 
is another reason for focusing on the hiddenness argument here. Since it 
is a relatively new argument, driven in part by secularization processes 
that have had some considerable influence in the last few centuries, it fits 
nicely with my emphasis on how we are still very much at the beginning 
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of things where religion and its discussion are concerned and nowhere 
near the end.
But what matters here is whether the hiddenness argument is a good 
argument, capable of justifying atheistic belief or acceptance. So let’s 
have a  look. There are various ways of formulating the argument. The 
way I have chosen to use is the following:
(1) If no perfectly loving God exists, then God does not exist.
(2) If a perfectly loving God exists, then there exists a God who is 
always open to personal relationship with any finite person.
(3) If there exists a God who is always open to personal relationship 
with any finite person, then no finite person is ever nonresistantly 
in a  state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God 
exists.
(4) If a  perfectly loving God exists, then no finite person is ever 
nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition 
that God exists (from 2 & 3).
(5) Some finite persons are or have been nonresistantly in a state of 
nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists.
(6) No perfectly loving God exists (from 4 & 5).
(7) God does not exist (from 1 & 6).
The phraseology here is a bit loose in places, but if one wants to convey 
a clear first impression it helps not to weigh the argument down with 
numerous explanatory clauses, and we can tighten things up as we go 
along.
The first thing to notice about the argument is that the inferences at 
steps (4), (6), and (7) are clearly deductively valid. So we can focus on 
whether the premises should win our belief or acceptance.
Shall we go along with premise (1): if no perfectly loving God exists, 
then God does not exist? Well, the idea of a person-like God – which as 
I’ve noted is the idea of God that the modest atheist, like the old atheist, 
is concerned with – represents one way in which the religious idea of 
an ultimate reality has been interpreted by human beings. Notice also 
that it is only or mainly as a candidate for metaphysical and axiological 
ultimacy that God comes to have a place in the discussions of western 
philosophy. Now, as one might expect, given that word ‘ultimate’, God is 
commonly regarded as having all knowledge and all power – or at least 
as much as it makes sense to suppose a person like God could have. For 
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the same reason of ultimacy, God is said to be the source of our existence 
and perfectly good. But God is also commonly said to be perfectly loving 
toward created beings. And this attribute is at least as obviously essential 
as the others. For the best love, love of the sort we rightly admire, is one 
of the most impressive features any person, man or woman, can display. 
Perhaps it is one of the results of recent cultural evolution that we can 
now see this more clearly than humans once did. How could a candidate 
for ‘greatest possible person’ be anything but a fraud if it weren’t always 
possessed of the greatest possible love? Whatever stunning attributes it 
displayed, we would then be able to imagine an even greater person, who 
was perfectly loving. It seems incumbent, therefore, on everyone who 
today reflects on the existence of God to acknowledge that if God exists, 
God is perfectly loving. Christians of course have specially emphasized 
this attribute but for all theists and atheists in philosophy there is good 
reason to do so.
Let’s move on, then, to premise (2): if a perfectly loving God exists, 
then there exists a God who is always open to personal relationship with 
any finite person. That phrase ‘personal relationship’ should at this point 
be tightened up a bit: what I have in mind is a conscious and (positively) 
meaningful relationship. I  should also acknowledge a  point that, once 
acknowledged, will remain tacit: namely, that the scope of premise 
(2) is restricted to finite persons who are relevantly capable, where the 
relevant capacities are cognitive and affective capacities sufficient to be 
able at the time in question to be in a meaningful conscious relationship 
with God – such things as a capacity then to feel the presence of God, 
recognizing it as such; a capacity to exhibit attitudes of trust, gratitude, 
and obedience to God, and so on.
Now, some theists might be inclined to resist this premise because 
of a  prior commitment to a  religious scripture or creed incompatible 
with it or in tension with it. Isn’t the God of the Bible, for example, often 
portrayed as somewhat distant relationally? But none of this can be 
relevant here where we are considering what the modest atheist must do 
to rise above epistemological suspicion. The modest atheist, who like the 
old atheist is working within a philosophical frame of reference, cannot be 
limited by theological assumptions which have been formed because of 
the need to find room for God in our world. It shouldn’t need to be said, 
but in the present circumstances of inquiry in philosophy of religion, 
which is filled with believing philosophers, it has to be emphasized 
that philosophers cannot assume because of some consensus in their 
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communities that God exists and so has only those qualities compatible 
with creating a world like ours, but must seek to be guided by reason 
when considering what a God would be like.
So what does careful reasoning, which seeks to be attentive to all that 
we humans have learned, tell us? Well, it makes it clear that people who 
admirably love you (and thus any who perfectly love you) are invariably 
open to a  kind of personal relationship with you in which the two of 
you can interact meaningfully and consciously with each other. Indeed, 
since they love you in this way, they want to be close to you, and close in 
a way you can appreciate, so you can turn to them for advice or draw on 
their support or just feel them present with you when that’s needed. (Of 
course if they admirably love you, they’ll value being with you for its own 
sake, too.) Now, it’s true that they won’t force any of this on you, which 
is one reason why I only used the word ‘open’ when stating this premise. 
There is even room here for a sort of withdrawal within relationship. But 
if they aren’t at least open to such relationship, it would be a mistake to 
say they admirably love you.
To see this with full clarity, imagine that you’re listening to a friend, 
who’s describing his parents: ‘Wow, are they ever great – I wish everyone 
could have parents like mine, who are so wonderfully loving! Granted, 
they don’t want anything to do with me. They’re never around. Sometimes 
I  find myself looking for them  – once, I  have to admit, I  even called 
out for them when I was sick – but to no avail. Apparently they’re just 
not open to a relationship with me right now. But it’s so good that they 
love me as much and as beautifully as they do!’ If you heard your friend 
talking like this, you’d think he was seriously confused. And you’d be 
right. His parents, if your friend’s description of them is correct, could 
certainly be lots of other things – even impressive things, like the best 
corporate lawyer in the country and the President – but their attitude 
toward their son, whatever it is, does not include an admirable love.
I expect you’ll see how all of this can be applied to God. A careful look 
at the concept of love should lead us to affirm that God is always open to 
personal relationship with each of us (or with each of the beings a God 
would or might create, whoever they are), if God exists and is perfectly 
loving – which is to say that premise (2) is true.
Now, so far I’ve been treating the concept of ‘openness’ to relationship 
as one we all understand, and at an  intuitive level I’m sure this is the 
case. But as we move on to premise (3) – if there exists a God who is 
always open to personal relationship with any finite person, then no 
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finite person is ever nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to 
the proposition that God exists  – we will need to probe this concept 
a bit more carefully. So let’s have a look at that word ‘open’ and how it 
behaves, logically speaking. In particular, let’s note a sufficient condition 
of someone not being open in the relevant way:
Not Open
If a person A, without having brought about this condition through 
resistance of personal relationship with person B, is at some time in 
a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that B exists, where 
B at that time knows this and could ensure that A’s nonbelief is at that 
time changed to belief, then it is not the case that B is open at the time 
in question to having a personal relationship with A then.
Indeed, in such circumstances B (if B exists) is consciously preventing 
such a relationship from existing at that time. And if anything is obvious, 
it is that you cannot be open to a relationship in the relevant way while 
consciously preventing it! We can apply this to God, who of course 
possesses all relevant knowledge and ability: if any finite person is ever 
nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to God’s existence, then 
there is no God always open to personal relationship with each finite 
person. Another way of putting that point gives us its contrapositive, 
which is premise (3): if there exists a God who is always open to personal 
relationship with each finite person, then no finite person is ever 
nonresistantly in a state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that 
God exists.
So premise (3) seems quite clearly believable too. What about the last 
premise that needs to be checked, premise (5): some finite persons – and 
of course I have in mind human beings – are or have been nonresistantly 
in a  state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists? 
Here again theology may tempt some theistic thinkers to suppose that 
our modest atheist is stepping outside the bounds of what should be 
believed. For might not any one of us be secretly resistant to a holy and 
demanding God, blinded to the motives that grip us? If so, then perhaps 
those who don’t believe in God are, in a way, hiding from God. Might 
the proponent of the hiddenness argument have managed to get things 
backward in this way?
Notice first that she needn’t be thinking about herself: perhaps 
other nonbelievers strike her as displaying nonresistance by the same 
standards that leave her questioning her own. Indeed, how could 
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an investigator help noticing that some people who don’t believe in God 
still have an  admirable track record of investigation, and emotionally 
are, if anything, biased in favour of God? Some people who find that 
the evidence of argument and experience has taken belief in God away 
in midstream, as it were, in the midst of a strenuous religious life, would 
love to believe in God. What reason could someone have to say that they 
are resisting a relationship with God? It strains – and indeed breaks – 
credulity. The evidence of nonresistance here can pile up in such a way 
that an honest inquirer judges it to be stronger than any counterevidence. 
Even if in such circumstances one thinks belief is unjustified because 
of new and unsuspected evidence that only future inquiry may reveal, 
clearly acceptance of a premise like (5) is justified given that the available 
evidence strongly supports it.
But even this is a weaker stance than is justified when we consider that 
we needn’t stay focused on people who have thought about the existence 
of God and so have come within the range of motives for resisting it. 
Behind them, as it were, stretching into places far distant from any 
affected by Western culture, and also into times long ago, before humans 
had so much as conceived of an all knowing, all good and loving creator 
of the universe, we find evidence of individuals and communities who, 
though capable of possessing it, lacked belief in God, and obviously 
without ever having blinded themselves by resisting God in any way. 
How could there be resistance in such a case? The critic of (5) needs you 
to look away from all this evidence for nonresistant nonbelief. But to do 
so would be to fall prey to blindness of another kind.
The four premises of the hiddenness argument therefore seem clearly 
true. Since, as we have already seen, its three inferences are clearly valid, 
it follows that the argument seems clearly sound. Shall we therefore 
pronounce in favour of a belief or acceptance type of response to modest 
atheism?
Many philosophers will think that there could still be good reasons 
not to do so. For example, it may be said that there are powerful defeating 
objections showing one or another of the hiddenness argument’s 
premises to be false or undercutting the justification for believing or 
accepting some such premise, or that there are equally strong arguments 
for theism to be weighed on the other side. Of course there isn’t time here 
to examine closely all the reasoning I’ve just alluded to, but I think some 
illuminating general comments may still be made.
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Let’s start with the last idea mentioned, that of equally strong 
arguments for theism. Even the most respected and spirited defenders 
of theism – take Richard Swinburne, for example – would shrink from 
a claim of the sort I have made on behalf of atheism: they would deny 
that there is a  sound deductive proof of the truth of theism. And it is 
not hard to see why things should be harder here for theism than for 
atheism. If the existence of God requires that there be a person who is all 
powerful, all-knowing, perfectly good and loving, as well as the creator 
of the universe, then arguments for theism have the task of showing that 
all those conditions are present. But an argument for atheism need only 
show that one such condition is absent. (It may, for example, endeavour 
to show, as does the hiddenness argument, that perfect love is absent.) 
And the latter task might be expected to be the easier one. Indeed, it 
is notorious that the so-called theistic proofs are quite incapable of 
proving the existence of a being with the whole collection of properties 
possessed by the theistic God. (Even the ontological argument suffers 
from this incapacity, for although it purports to prove the existence of 
a greatest possible being, there is nothing in it to imply that a greatest 
possible being would be a greatest possible person, with such properties 
as knowledge and love.) Atheism does not have an analogous problem, 
and so we have the argumentative asymmetry.
What about the alleged defeating objections to premises of the 
hiddenness argument (or to our belief or acceptance of them)? I myself 
have done a thorough investigation of these objections and have found 
them all wanting. Indeed, I have created many new objections, in order 
to test the argument  – with the same result. Now, it is of course true 
that others, especially philosophers who are theists, may disagree with 
me about one or another objection. But there is an  important point 
to be noted here: namely, that such disagreement is frequently not 
philosophically grounded. Oftentimes I appear to be met by philosophers 
who are operating as theologians rather than as philosophers when they 
question the hiddenness argument.
Perhaps the clearest example of what I am talking about here appears 
near the end of a paper by the American philosophers Ted Poston and 
Trent Dougherty (2007: 196):
In the final analysis Schellenberg’s argument fails because it envisions 
God as requiring too much: explicit, highly confident belief at all times. 
Fortunately, God is more generous. The Christian tradition attests that 
God will accept far less, he will ‘meet us where we are’.
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Now, at first this may seem a relevant criticism. But listen to it carefully. 
When I first did so, I was truly startled: How could it be thought that the 
hiddenness argument depicts God as requiring belief of anyone and thus 
as ungenerous – with the implication that if the hiddenness argument 
were right about God, God would be leaving some – namely nonresistant 
nonbelievers – out in the cold, since they are unable to come up with 
what is required? After all, what the hiddenness argument clearly says 
is that God would generously offer belief – and the explicit relationship 
made possible thereby – to all, and so there would be no nonresistant 
nonbelievers in a world created by God. But then I saw that there is in 
Poston and Dougherty a  tendency to assume that God exists and that 
whatever is being said about God must apply to the actual world – even 
when that comes in the context of an atheistic argument! Why else would 
it be supposed, when someone like me claims that God would favour 
explicit relationship, that those in the actual world who don’t have what 
it takes to participate in such relationship are going to be left out? How 
could what God wants be too much unless creatures are unable to deliver 
it, and how could they be thought unable to deliver it unless we are 
thinking about our world instead of the world the hiddenness argument 
says would exist if God existed, in which all who are nonresistant believe?
Sadly, many allegedly philosophical objections to the hiddenness 
argument display a tendency similar to the one I claim to have found in 
Poston and Dougherty, even if not so brazenly. Within a philosophical 
context they can have no weight at all. In a philosophical context, where 
we have to let the voice of authority grow dim and think for ourselves 
about what a perfect personal being would be like, we may notice points 
that undermine the allegedly undermining objections to the hiddenness 
argument.
This holds also for a strategy quite popular today, known as ‘sceptical 
theism,’ which questions how we could justifiedly rule out the existence 
of unknown goods for the sake of which God is hidden. Accepting this 
move in the absence of some special theological bias or preconception 
seems to require forgetting what theism has got us talking about in the 
first place – an ultimate person. Consider by way of analogy a single man 
who marries and has children: Does this behaviour not rightly constrain 
the goods he is willing to pursue, at least insofar as he is a loving husband 
and father? Though when he was on his own he spent time with many 
female friends and was otherwise preoccupied with his own wide-
ranging pursuits, travelling to far-flung regions of the earth for months 
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at a time, shifting from place to place and from one activity to another, 
now things are different – and quite naturally and rightly so. Now he has 
a family to help provide for, to support in emotional and financial ways. 
He can’t just take off for Greece or France for long periods at a time to 
indulge his own interests. Better, he has new interests which lead him 
happily to say no when invitations to do such things arise. Similarly with 
God, if God is to be regarded as a loving person – an ultimately loving 
person – who has created vulnerable finite persons to be the object of 
Divine love. The ‘God’ described by sceptical theists who may, for all we 
know, have purposes quite unrelated to us that require hiddenness from 
us is not an ultimately loving being at all. If construed personally, such 
a God is comparable to a  limited or delinquent father or mother who 
simply can’t or won’t live up to the demands taken on board when the 
commitments of marriage and family are entered into.
I  suggest, therefore, that on the basis of such considerations as 
I have briefly aired a great deal can be done to warrant, in the context 
of philosophical inquiry, setting aside our two counter-suggestions  – 
concerning equally strong arguments for theism and crippling objections 
to the hiddenness argument – without entering into many details of the 
associated reasoning.
But here’s another counter-suggestion. Perhaps it will be suggested 
that there is also non-propositional experiential evidence to be considered 
here. Might not people who find themselves in the grip of suitably 
powerful experiences apparently of God have grounds for resisting the 
hiddenness argument – perhaps for saying that something is wrong with 
it, even if they know not what and though they lack any reasoning to offer 
against it? Recently philosophers of religion have been much concerned 
with questions of this sort, often defending an  affirmative answer 
(Swinburne 2004, Alston 1991, Plantinga 2000). But the most that could 
conceivably be shown by this means is that theistic religious experience 
brings a  non-atheistic response to the question of God’s existence up 
to a  level of worthiness for those inquirers who find themselves in the 
relevant experiential circumstances. It could not be shown that it brings 
an atheistic response down to a level of unworthiness for those who lack 
such non-propositional evidence.
Obviously there is no space here for a  proper discussion of the 
epistemology of religious experience. But again some general comments 
suggest themselves which show that what I’ve found conceivable here is 
not actually to be expected, given the facts on the ground. For example, 
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experiences apparently of God, to do the epistemic work required of them 
here, would have to be more forceful and also more discriminating than 
religious experiences often are. By ‘discriminating’ I mean they would 
need to clearly have theistic as opposed to any other religious content.
Now when we have perceptual experiences of other human persons 
our experiences commonly are discriminating in the relevant way: I see 
from the phenomenological details of my experience that it is John Greco 
before me and not Paul Draper or Roger Pouivet. Religious perceptual 
experiences are often much more fluid and malleable. It will, I suspect, 
be much easier in many cases to get someone to back down from the 
claim that the omni-God of traditional personalist theism was present to 
her to the claim that something powerfully transcendent was present to 
her than it will be to get me to back down from the claim that I saw John 
Greco to the claim that some human being or other stood before me. And 
if their degree of modesty about such things is tailored to our possible 
evolutionary immaturity, which here as elsewhere we are called to take 
into account, I think even philosophical inquirers in the grip of religious 
experience may accordingly often find its epistemic force less obvious 
and relevant than would be required to support the judgment we are 
considering. And we have not yet said anything about the problem, 
which arises for those who reject the argument I’ve just given, of religious 
experiential diversity.
So without too much discussion of details we can see that alleged 
proofs of theism, objections to the hiddenness argument, and suggestions 
about theistic religious experience may not gain much traction among 
those who earnestly and as philosophers investigate the question whether 
there is a God and, in that context, wonder what force the hiddenness 
argument should be regarded as having.
So what exactly am I  proposing  – that a  belief response to modest 
atheism is justified for philosophers thinking about the existence of God, 
or that acceptance is? I will provide some more defence for each of the 
disjuncts of the disjunction suggested here in turn, hoping to impress 
each relevant investigator with at least one of my arguments and thus 
successfully to defend the disjunction in relation to everyone.
Let’s start with belief. Each of the premises and also each of the 
inference claims of the hiddenness argument can be made to appear 
worthy of belief, and the counter-suggestions we have considered seem 
not obviously capable of diminishing this justification for the belief that 
the theistic God does not exist. Now, of course, we have been unable 
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here to examine many details of those counter-arguments; but nor 
have we been able to examine other important deductive arguments for 
atheism, which, as I have maintained elsewhere (Schellenberg 2007), can 
be combined with the hiddenness argument to produce an even more 
forceful case for atheistic belief. A definitive outcome is, for these reasons, 
not in the cards today but I still conclude that atheistic belief in the part 
of philosophical inquiry concerning God has been made defensible, 
or more defensible, by my arguments in this paper – especially since it 
is a  modest atheism that I  have in mind, open to the idea that other 
conceptions of the divine demand inquiry.
But precisely this modesty, and its rootedness in scientific facts about 
our place in time, an objector may now wish to query more closely in 
an attempt to overturn my conclusion about atheistic belief. Are we not 
‘in over our heads’ when we reach a belief about the existence of God, 
given the vast diversity of arguments from perhaps better equipped 
future inquirers that we are in the nature of the case unable to sample? 
Elsewhere, I  have defended such reasoning in relation to the broader 
idea that there is no ultimate divine reality (Schellenberg 2007). Why 
isn’t it equally applicable to the narrower but equally profound claim that 
there is no personal God?
Well, modest atheism, let us remember, denies only the existence of 
a person-like ultimate: an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good and 
loving creator of the universe. It makes the negative claim that there is 
no such divine being. This is not nearly so ambitious or profound a claim 
as the positive claim that there is such a being, or even as the negative 
claim that there is no religious reality of any kind, for it has many fewer 
metaphysical consequences. Think of how thorough a story of the overall 
nature of things you could tell, knowing that there is a God! But if all 
you know is that there isn’t a God, you’ve just ruled out one way things 
could be. Indeed, you’ve only ruled out one religious way things could 
be; many other religious ways things could be, with similar metaphysical 
implications, remain. And so there’s no justification, given only modest 
atheism, for an  endorsement of such profound metaphysical claims 
as that of naturalism – though many immodest theists are mistakenly 
inclined to see the latter as following from atheism.
It should also be noted that by seeking only to refute traditional 
theism, we remain ‘close to home’ and need to mobilize no more than 
certain concepts and considerations we already possess. For the basic idea 
of a personal God, as traditionally understood, extrapolates from certain 
67THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF MODEST ATHEISM
basic facts about ourselves – our limited power, knowledge, goodness, 
love – and thus from human qualities we do already know something 
about even at the present stage of our development. All my claims in this 
paper about how such a God could be revealed to us are unaffected by 
the awareness that many other conceptions of the divine remain to be 
explored and may indeed be outside the range of our current powers of 
conceptualization.
Here’s another thought worth considering in this context. (It’s related 
to the last one in that it simplifies the atheist’s job even further.) Some 
of my arguments can make use of insights that draw on recent findings, 
for example in psychology and feminist thought, where we find a natural 
connection between admirable love and commitment to relationship. 
Thus their claims need to be considered as contenders for the status of 
propositions quite ‘clear’ in themselves but only now becoming clear 
to us: that is, as representing the forward edge of new and positive 
evolutionary developments. If this can be shown for atheism but not 
for theism, then once more we see how arguments justifying modest 
atheistic belief may be available even given only our present resources, 
though the arguments for theism fall short.
Having said all that in defence of modest atheistic belief in 
philosophy, I  think another interesting argument that can be made, 
if that defence fails, is for atheism’s acceptability. Of course we would 
expect philosophers who believe atheistically to also act upon this belief 
in inquiry, but arguments for acceptance are arguments for something 
like acting on the modest atheistic claim even when you don’t yet believe 
it. And here, as Cohen makes clear (1992), pragmatic considerations 
concerning the needs of inquiry may be importantly relevant.
So consider these facts. (1) Inquiry about religion in western 
philosophy has been going on for thousands of years, and for most of 
that time has almost obsessively focused on theism and things theistic, 
hardly ever venturing into the potentially vast regions beyond. (2) The 
latest report (Chalmers and Bourget 2013) has it that 73% of philosophers 
today favour atheism. Now, the figure would surely be different if we 
restricted our concern to the opinions of so-called philosophers of 
religion, who are predominantly believing theists. But while it might be 
argued that this is deserving of notice on the grounds that philosophers 
of religion are the experts on religion in philosophy, we would need to 
set against this point the fact that most of these so-called philosophers of 
religion, again, have not ventured beyond theism in their investigations, 
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and also the fact that (3) many of them are deeply motivated by loyalty 
to their religious communities, and so should perhaps be regarded as 
doing theology – even if philosophical theology – rather than philosophy 
(Draper & Nichols 2013, Schellenberg 2009). Finally, we need to note – 
as, in part, a consequence of points already made – that (4) acceptance 
of atheism does not in any way imply (as those suppose who erroneously 
think one must accept either theism or naturalism) that we are closing 
the door to the truth of religious claims. Indeed, we are opening it more 
widely than has ever been done before!
What should a philosopher say who seeks to be sensitive to all these 
facts  – while sensitive also to our temporal position and unwilling to 
endorse atheistic belief – and who notices that the latest arguments for 
atheism are as apparently forceful as the hiddenness argument? I think 
she should favour the acceptance of atheism.
Now it can be difficult to achieve a  proper balance: When do you 
accept a  conclusion and when do you say we should wait for more 
evidence? Many philosophers today would say that we are rushing things 
if we accept that theism is false. I would suggest that we know enough to 
do so. The details theistic ideas contain allow inferences about what most 
fundamentally has value and how it is realized if this filling for the idea of 
an ultimate divine reality is realized – and also the inference to atheism – 
to be made. And I say we should get on with exploring other fillings for 
the idea of a divine reality, leaving open the possibility that the latter is 
true and so neither believing nor accepting that it is false. I have named 
the more general proposition here, the proposition more general than 
theism, ‘ultimism’. The idea is that even at this early stage of religious 
investigation we should draw conclusions where we can, to help keep 
inquiry moving, while being very careful not to foreclose inquiry where 
we shouldn’t. The distinction I  have suggested between the epistemic 
status of ultimism, which says only that there is a  metaphysically, 
axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality of some kind, and that 
of its personalist elaboration seems to me to get this balance about right 
and to respond appropriately to the needs of inquiry concerning religion 
in philosophy. But if so, then even if modest atheistic belief is thought to 
be unjustified in the precincts of philosophy, atheistic acceptance can still 
be justified.
A concluding summary, then, might run as follows. Epistemological 
considerations can be seen to favour an atheistic response in philosophy 
to questions about God’s existence when we consider our subject 
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carefully, distinguishing between belief and acceptance, and in a context 
governed by scientific timescales. The sort of atheism that is thus justified 
is a modest atheism. It claims to have extinguished the light from, at most, 
one of the many facets of the concept of a Divine reality. And it makes 
this claim only after discovering arguments of seemingly compelling 
force. These arguments can be used to defend modest atheistic belief as 
the preferable response to questions about a personal God in the context 
of philosophical inquiry. And even if this conclusion were to be left 
unsecured, perhaps because of the demands of deep time scepticism, 
there would still be reason to take such arguments as justifying the 
acceptance of modest atheism at the present stage of religious inquiry. 
It seems, therefore, that a modern and modest atheism can acquit itself 
admirably at the bar of epistemological reason.
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